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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose two secure virtual private network architectures for the long-term evolution backhaul network.
They are layer 3 Internet protocol (IP) security virtual private network architectures based on Internet key exchange version
2 mobility and multihoming protocol and host identity protocol. Both architectures satisfy a complete set of 3GPP backhaul
security requirements such as authentication, authorization, payload encryption, privacy protection, and IP-based attack
prevention. The security analysis and simulation results verify that the proposed architectures are capable enough to protect
long-term evolution backhaul traffic against various IP-based attacks. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile broadband usage is growing faster than the fixed
Internet usage because of the rapid increment of mobile
subscribers and bandwidth-hungry mobile applications.
It is envisioned that high speed packet access (HSPA)
and HSPA+ architectures are not adequate to facilitate
future mobile networks services. Thus, long-term evolu-
tion (LTE)/LTE-advance architectures will dominate in the
near future. LTE architecture consists of a new all-Internet
protocol (IP) backhaul network. The existing non-IP-based
security mechanisms are not adequate enough to pro-
vide a sufficient level of security for all-IP-based LTE
backhaul networks. Thus, 3GPP specified new security
requirements for the LTE backhaul network [1–6]. For
example, LTE core elements now establish connections
with less secure noncore elements such as evolved NodeBs
(eNBs) and microcell base stations (BSs). The capturing
of such devices is comparably easier than core backhaul
element, and the number of entry points is comparably
higher in LTE networks because of femtocell deployments
[5]. Thus, denial of service (DoS) attacks are highly prob-
able in LTE networks. However, the existing LTE traffic
architectures are incapable to provide a sufficient level of
security for the backhaul network against such IP-based
attacks. The primary focus of this research is to study
these security requirements of LTE backhaul network and
build a secure LTE backhaul traffic architecture to pro-
tect the LTE backhaul communication channels from the
IP-based attacks.
On the other hand, LTE backhaul supports heteroge-
neous traffic types, such as S1-U traffic from eNBs to the
service gateway (S-GW), S1-C traffic from eNBs to the
mobility management entity (MME), and X2-U and X2-C
traffic between eNBs (Figure 1) [7]. It is a crucial traf-
fic transport issue to provide different levels of quality
of service (QoS), queuing priorities and fault manage-
ment services for different traffic classes. Virtual private
network (VPN)-based backhaul traffic architectures suc-
cessfully solve above traffic transport issues, and several
research studies verified the applicability of such VPN
architectures [7–10]. However, none of these VPN archi-
tectures consider the security aspect of LTE backhaul
network. However, 3GPP specifications [1–3] have spec-
ified the requirements of IP security (IPsec) in order to
protect the S1 and X2 control plane. For both S1-MME and
X2-C interfaces, Internet key exchange version 2 (IKEv2)
certificates-based authentication shall be implemented [3].
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Figure 1. The long-term evolution transport network. eNB, evolved NodeB; MME, mobility management entity.
Therefore, it is required to design a new LTE backhaul
VPN architecture that not only solves traffic transport
issues but also provides the protection against IP-based
attacks by implementing IPsec tunneling.
 Our contribution
To satisfy the aforementioned LTE backhaul network secu-
rity requirements, this paper contributes the following:
(1) Proposal of two secure VPN-based backhaul traf-
fic architectures. Namely, IPsec tunnel mode VPN
architecture based on Internet key exchange version
2 mobility and multihoming protocol (MOBIKE)
and IPsec bound end-to-end tunnel (BEET) mode
VPN architecture based on host identity protocol
(HIP).
(2) Proposal of novel message exchange procedures
to dynamically and securely add new network
nodes/devices to the LTE backhaul network.
(3) Proposal of a novel tunnel-established procedure
to establish secure VPN tunnels between backhaul
devices.
The security analysis reveals that proposed architec-
tures satisfy a complete set of 3GPP security requirements
such as authentication, authorization, payload encryption,
and privacy protection and protect the backhaul network
against IP-based attacks. On the other hand, the proposed
VPN-based traffic architectures also solve the aforemen-
tioned traffic transport issues. Moreover, the material in
this paper was presented in part at [11].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The back-
ground of LTE backhaul network and its security issues
are presented in Section 2. Related works are mentioned in
Section 3. The proposed VPN architectures are presented
in Sections 4 and 5. We discuss simulation models and the
protection from IP-based attacks in Section 6. The secu-
rity and performance analysis of the proposed architectures
are presented in Sections 7 and 8, respectively. The future
directions and additional features of the proposed archi-
tectures are discussed in Section 9. Finally, Section 10
concludes the paper.




2.1. Long-term evolution mobile
backhaul network
The LTE transport network contains three segments,
namely, radio access, backhaul, and core networks. The
backhaul network further subdivides into two sections:
access and aggregation networks. Figure 1 illustrates a
simple LTE transport network.
The access network connects eNBs sites to aggrega-
tion nodes. Usually, it has a tree and/or chain topology.
The aggregation network very often has a ring and/or mesh
topology. It is normally terminated at the core network
where S-GWs and MME devices are located. Hence, the
backhaul network extends from the first transport equip-
ment connecting cell sites (e.g., eNBs sites) to the transport
aggregation equipment connecting central sites (e.g., S-
GWs/MME sites) [12]. In addition, the LTE backhaul
network contains several traffic transport interfaces (e.g.,
S1 and X2).
2.2. Security issues of long-term evolution
backhaul network
3GPP specifications propose an entirely new flatten and
all-IP-based architecture for the LTE backhaul network. It
distributes some of the control functionality throughout the
network. Hence, it pushes more intelligence to end nodes
such as eNBs. These properties redefine the security and
other service requirements of the LTE backhaul network.
Long-term evolution networks face new security threats
that did not exist before or were harder to exploit in previ-
ous 2G/3G mobile backhaul networks. The security threats
originate at various sections of LTE network, namely, cus-
tomer nodes, backhaul network, customer provider inter-
face network, radio access network, and core network.
Hence, it is necessary to implement dedicated security
mechanisms in each section to avoid these potential threats.
This research focuses on the possible threats only on the
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backhaul network. Three main reasons are identified for
security threats in LTE backhaul [4–8,13,14].
First, LTE backhaul consists of IP-based control/service
devices (e.g., MMEs, S-GWs, and eNBs) and interfaces
(e.g., X2 and S1). As a result, the backhaul network is
now vulnerable to IP-based attacks and breaches [5]. More-
over, an intruder can directly attack core gateways even
from a breach at the access network because of the IP-base
communication (e.g., address spoofing attacks) [13].
Second, LTE backhaul network is now a carrier Ether-
net environment with hundreds or thousands of end nodes
(e.g., eNBs). Hence, an intruder has thousands of potential
entry points in the backhaul network [4,5,13]. Moreover,
the flat architecture concept proposes to distribute the cer-
tain control functionalities even for eNBs [6]. Hence, a
single eNB acquisition is sufficient enough for an attacker
to do a significant damage to the network. On the other
hand, LTE architecture introduces new interfaces to mobile
networks. For instance, X2 interface is used to transport the
peer-to-peer data and control traffic between eNBs and S1
interfaces is used to transport the user data and control traf-
fic between eNBs and core elements. LTE networks allow
an eNB to connect to multiple core network elements (up to
16) via S1 interfaces and multiple eNBs (up to 32) via X2
interface to achieve better performance and lower latency
performance [15,16]. In contrast to prior 2G/3G networks,
LTE eNBs now have more connections not only with other
eNBs but also core network elements.
Third, the focus of security in 2G networks was the
air interface, which was terminated at the BS for circuit-
switched voice services. The backhaul network based on
circuit-switched links was considered trusted. For 3G, it
was a design decision that termination of the encryption
for both services would move further into the core network
at the radio network controller, for example, to encompass
microwave links and most of the backhaul network. How-
ever, LTE backhaul does not have built-in security in bearer
data as it was the case with 2G/3G networks. Prior to LTE
architecture, traffic in backhaul network was secured by
radio network layer protocols, and they encrypt the back-
haul traffic [6,14]. However, these air interface encryptions
of user and control plane traffic terminate at eNBs in LTE
networks. As a result, LTE backhaul traffic can be eaves-
dropped by unauthorized users, and this information can be
used to pose the DoS and man-in-the-middle attacks to the
backhaul network.
Some research studies have already highlighted the
potential risks that related to new LTE backhaul net-
work [17–20]. A single event triggered on the phone (for
instance, a state transition in the radio resource control
state machine) implies a substantial number of messages
exchanged among several LTE backhaul nodes. This could
be exploited to become a distributed DoS (DDoS) attack
by infecting many phones [19]. Bassil et al. [17] investi-
gate the effects of signaling attacks that consist of mali-
cious users who repeatedly trigger the dedicated bearers
requests. Jover [18] analyzes attacks that can affect the
LTE backhaul network availability. Moreover, common
DoS and DDoS attacks on other IP networks could have
a severe effect on network performance on new IP-based
LTE backhaul, for instance, by a fortuitous error in an
android application that created havoc in one of the mobile
networks [19]. In [17], the authors identify that advanced
persistent threats, which are well organized and financed,
can have very negative effects and provoke both general
and very targeted attacks. Such attacks were not possible
in prior non-IP mobile backhaul networks. Although, most
of these IP attacks are common to other IP networks, these
attacks are still new for mobile networks as they were not
vulnerable to such attacks before.
2.3. Internet protocol-based attack
scenarios in the long-term evolution
backhaul network
Above security issues in an LTE backhaul network moti-
vate many attackers, such as cyber terrorists, individual
competitors, and hackers. They can perform IP-based
attacks on LTE backhaul to disturb the operation of
the mobile network. These attacks can be categorized
as follows.
 DoS attacks
Long-term evolution architecture is also used to central-
ize control devices similar to previous 2G/3G networks.
For instance, home subscriber server (HSS) is a central
authentication node that stores information for every sub-
scriber in the network. It contains the subscriber-related
information including QoS profiles, roaming restrictions,
billing and account information, cryptographic primitives,
and keys to perform authentication of subscribers [15].
These centralized network elements are honeypots for DoS
attackers. DoS attacker can insert excessive amount of
forged packets to the backhaul to disturb the operation
of vital devices. As a result, unexpected service break-
downs and system failures may occur. Ultimately, the
whole mobile network may be unresponsive to provide
services for mobile subscribers. For instance, a successful
attack on HSS can jeopardize the entire operation of LTE
network [5]. Therefore, it is required to implement proper
DoS attack mitigation mechanism to protect centralized
entities in LTE backhaul networks.
Distributed DoS attacks are another variation of DoS
attacks. In DDoS attack, more than one attacker is releas-
ing forge packets to the backhaul network. Most of the LTE
backhaul entities are connected to multiple other entities.
For instance, HSS can be connected to several MMEs [15].
An eNB can be connected to at most 16 other eNBs. This
feature motivates DDoS attackers. The attacker can imper-
sonate or capture multiple entities in the backhaul networks
to attack the important network elements [5]. In contrast to
2G/3G networks, LTE core elements now establish connec-
tions with less secure non-core elements such as eNBs and
microcell BSs. Capturing of such devices is comparably
easier than core backhaul element, and the number of entry
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points is comparably higher in LTE networks because of
femtocell deployments [5]. Thus, DDoS attacks are highly
probable in LTE networks.
 Spoofing attacks
All-IP-based LTE networks are vulnerable to IP address
spoofing attacks [4,13]. IP spoofing is a serious threat in
LTE backhaul networks. An attacker can eavesdrop the
control signaling data and hijack the IP address of a legit-
imate node. If the attacker hijacks the IP address while it
is being returned to the IP pool, the other party will not be
able to detect this threat. Thus, the other party will provide
the services without identifying the attacker [4].
 Message modification attacks
Integrity protection is one of the key security require-
ment in mobile networks. The data modification attacks
impose serious issues in LTE backhaul networks. The
integrity violation of LTE control signaling directly affects
performance of network. For instance, the attacker can
modify the control signaling data to reduce buffer sizes,
queue lengths, and timer values of backhaul components.
It degrades the overall performance of the network. Modi-
fying data transport in S6a interface may result to provide
unauthorized services to mobile subscribers [15].
 Reset attacks
Long-term evolution backhaul devices exchange a sig-
nificant number of control messages during the bearer
establishment and disconnecting instances. A reset attacker
can perform reset attack by sending malicious reset
requests to terminate an ongoing bearer sessions or re-
establish these bearer sessions. In that way, the attacker can
generate massive amount of signaling data to overload the
LTE backhaul networks. For instance, a reset attacker who
gets the access to eNBs can reset up to 32 X2 and 16 S1
interface bearers [13,15].
 Eavesdropping attacks
Long-term evolution core elements now establish con-
nections with less secure non-core elements such as eNBs
and microcell BSs. Capturing of such devices is compara-
bly easier than core backhaul element, and the number of
entry points is comparably higher in LTE networks because
of femtocell deployments [5]. Therefore, eavesdropping is
also a serious security issue in LTE networks. For instance,
an attacker can tap in to the S1 interface; he or she can
extract signaling and user information. Later, this informa-
tion can be used to perform reset and spoofing attacks. If
an attacker taps in to the X2 interface, it is possible to track
mobile users’ location and movements by monitoring the
handoff operations [13]. It seriously violates the privacy
of mobile users. Moreover, the attacker can steal the cre-
dentials of mobile users to perform overbilling attacks on
the particular users [4]. If an attacker taps into the con-
trol interfaces such as S11, SGi, G7, or S3, he or she can
obtain the important information about backhaul elements
[13,15]. This information can be used to modify the con-
figurations of LTE backhaul network components (e.g.,
routers, switches, and GWs).
In contrast to 2G/3G networks, LTE backhaul networks
are lacking of radio network layer encryption. Moreover,
IP-based backhaul traffic transportation attracts a huge
set of IP sniffer to attack the mobile networks. There-
fore, eavesdropping is also a serious security issue in LTE
networks. For instance, if an attacker taps into the S1
interface, he or she can extract signaling and user infor-
mation. Later, this information can be used to perform
reset and spoofing attacks. If an attacker taps into the
X2 interface, it is possible to track mobile users’ loca-
tion and movements by monitoring the handoff operations
[13]. It seriously violates the privacy of mobile users.
Moreover, the attacker can steal the credentials of mobile
users to perform overbilling attacks on the particular users
[4]. If an attacker taps into the control interfaces such
as S11, SGi, G7, or S3, he or she can obtain the impor-
tant information about backhaul elements [13,15]. These
information can be used to modify the configurations of
LTE backhaul network components (e.g., routers, switches,
and GWs).
2.4. Security requirements of the long-term
evolution backhaul network
According to 3GPP specifications, security is an indis-
pensable requirement of a backhaul traffic architecture. In
order to make the backhaul network as secure as possible,
3GPP specified security services including the following:
node authentication, node authorization, payload encryp-
tion, privacy protection, and IP-based attack prevention
[1–6].
Node authentication and authorization prevent unau-
thorized access to the backhaul network. It ensures that
the backhaul traffic is transported only between the legit-
imate devices (i.e., no impersonation of legitimate device
has occurred). Payload encryption prevents eavesdrop-
ping attacks on backhaul traffic. In addition, it secures
the integrity of the backhaul traffic by preventing in-
flight message modifications. Privacy protection hides
the identities of the important devices and secures them
from being a target of attackers. IP-based attack preven-
tion insures the availability and smooth operation of the
network devices.
2.5. Internet key exchange version 2
mobility and multihoming protocol
Internet key exchange was defined by Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) [21–23]. IKE uses to set up secu-
rity associations (SAs) for an IPsec tunnel. SAs define
the manner that two end points should communi-
cate securely. For instance, it defines traffic encryption
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:1198–1215 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1201
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algorithms, hash functions, and message authentica-
tion codes. On the other hand, IKE protocol mutually
authenticates the users and exchanges a secure key for
the encryption.
Because the specifications for IKE were covered in var-
ious request for comments (RFCs), IETF specified IKEv2
[24] to integrate all these RFCs. IKEv2 is the version 2
of the IKE protocol that not only combines all the IKE
RFCs but also provides additional features such as net-
work address translation traversal support, stream control
transmission protocol support, simplify the cryptographic
mechanisms, DoS attack resilience, and support for fire-
wall traversal.
However, either IKE or IKEv2 protocols cannot support
the mobility and/or multihoming features. In [25], authors
proposed a mobility and multihoming extension to IKEv2
that is called MOBIKE. MOBIKE allows users to move
from one IP address to another without re-establishing all
SAs and IPsec tunnels. This will become more impor-
tant with the introduction of LTE backhaul nodes such as
vehicular and mobile femtocells [26].
2.6. Host identity protocol
Host identity protocol is a new security and mobility pro-
tocol that is standardized by IETF [27,28]. It separates
the dual roles of IP address as an end-point identifier
and a locater. HIP introduces a new layer to transmission
control protocol (TCP)/IP model. It operates in between
the transport and Internet working layer. A self-generated
public–private key pair is used to generate the host iden-
tity (HI). Thus, HIP defines to use the public keys as new
HI name space and the end-point identifiers. However, an
HI may have variable length. Thus, a 128-bit hash of HI is
called host identity tag (HIT), which is used by upper-layer
applications as the end-point identifier. Hence, typical IP
addresses are used only for the locater role.
Host identity protocol nodes follow an initial procedure
called base exchange (BEX) before any data transfer event.
HIP BEX is a four-way handshake between end nodes
to establish SAs for an IPsec tunnel. HIP specification is
recommended to use IPsec BEET mode tunnel between
nodes. Furthermore, HIP BEX mutually authenticates end
nodes [27].
2.7. Comparison with existing Internet
protocol security solutions
Several key exchange mechanisms are widely used to set
up SAs for an IPsec tunnel, namely, Internet key exchange
version 1 [23], IKEv2 [24], MOBIKE [25], and HIP [27].
However, it is not possible to implement existing IPsec
solutions in LTE networks because of various issues. The
main issues in existing IPsec solutions are listed as follows:
 Lack of access control: Access control plays a
major role to ensure the confidentiality of the net-
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end-to-end tunnels and support only mutual authen-
tication. It does not provide the access control to
prevent unauthorized access to the network. Thus,
existing IPsec tunnel mechanisms fail to offer the
required confidentiality for mobile networks.
 Lack of protection over IP-based attacks: None of
the existing IPsec solutions can protect the commu-
nication channel against the spoofing, replay, and
man-in-the-middle attacks.
 Lack of traffic classification: The existing IPsec solu-
tions establish end-to-end tunnels without any traf-
fic classifications. However, LTE backhaul network
transports various traffic types that need different ser-
vice levels. Therefore, traffic classification (such as
VPN-based traffic classification) is required for LTE
backhaul networks.
 Distributed tunnel establishments: Legacy IPsec
mechanisms establish tunnels independently in dis-
tributed manner. However, LTE backhaul network
requires the coordination among the backhaul tun-
nels to prevent unauthorized access to backhaul and
unnecessary tunnel establishments.
Therefore, it is clear that existing IPsec solutions cannot
be implemented in LTE backhaul network. The proposed
traffic architecture provides the required modification to
implement IPsec tunneling-based secure traffic architec-
ture in LTE backhaul networks.
Table I contains a comparison of the proposed architec-
tures (tunnel and BEET mode VPN architectures) with the
existing IPsec-based solutions.
Therefore, it is clear that we need a new IPsec tunnel
architecture by modifying the operation of IPsec tunneling
to implement in LTE backhaul networks. Such architec-
tures should be able to provide not only the integrity but
also the confidentiality, visibility, and the ability to coordi-
nate via a centralized location. The proposed architectures
satisfy these requirements.
3. RELATED WORK
Long-term evolution backhaul networks need to satisfy
several LTE architectural requirements such as traffic
transportation, mobility management, topology manage-
ment, and security. These requirements are specified by
3GPP, and a summary of these requirements can be
found in [7,8]. On the other hand, LTE architecture
consists of an all-IP backhaul network. Hence, most
of the operators have to move from an existing pure
L2 (layer 2) topology to a full L3 (layer 3) topology.
Furthermore, operators should adapt not only new net-
work appliances but also new network technologies, espe-
cially new security technologies [5,6,8,12]. As a result,
network operators encounter a number of migration chal-
lenges when they move from the existing 2G/3G back-
haul to LTE backhaul. These challenges are discussed
in [4,12,29,30].
The backhaul network security is one of the key chal-
lenges of the future LTE architecture [1,6,30]. Network
appliance providers and operators identified that a secured
LTE backhaul model is a crucial demand for the future
LTE networks [1,6,7]. Basically, the mutual authentication
of eNBs and IP attack prevention is required for steady
operation of the LTE backhaul. Furthermore, 3GPP speci-
fication demands to encrypt data and signaling traffic that
is transported via an untrusted network [1]. However, the
existing backhaul architectures lack such security features.
In [7], authors proposed to secure LTE backhaul traffic
by using upper layer techniques. However, these upper
layer solutions are vulnerable to L3 TCP/IP-based attacks
such as TCP DoS [31], TCP reset [32], and IP spoofing
attacks [33].
Multiple types of traffic are transported in LTE back-
haul. Proper backhauling and providing different levels
of QoS for these heterogeneous traffics are critical chal-
lenges for network operators. Various L2 and L3 VPN
architectures can be used to overcome these issues [7,8].
In [8], authors compared the advantages and disadvan-
tages of different L2/L3 VPN architectures. However,
moving from a pure L2 topology to a full L3 VPN archi-
tecture has many advantages such as less provisioning
complexity, high operational flexibility, and high network
scalability [12].
Several techniques can be used to develop VPN mod-
els, and they can be categorized based on the operational
layer of open systems interconnection model. Transport
layer security (TLS) [34] and secure sockets layer (SSL)
[35] based VPNs are capable of providing secure VPN ser-
vice at application later. However, these VPN architectures
are vulnerable lower-layer attacks [36].
Most of the L3 backhaul traffic architectures are
developed based on multiprotocol label-switching pro-
tocol [7,37,38]. However, multiprotocol label-switching-
based VPN models do not provide any security features
like node authentication, data encryption, and privacy
protection. On the other hand, the control protocol of
these architectures is based on border gateway protocol
and label distribution protocol. The control protocol is
responsible to establish and maintain the VPN tunnels
between the backhaul nodes. However, both label dis-
tribution protocol [39] and border gateway protocol[40]
use insecure layer 4 TCP sessions that are vulnerable to
TCP/IP-based attacks such as TCP DoS and TCP reset
attacks [32].
Several other research articles proposed various mech-
anisms to enhance the security and resilience of different
sections of LTE network [41–43]. In [41], authors propose
a novel key derivation method to prevent eavesdropping
attacks in LTE radio network. Security analysis of han-
dover key management in LTE networks is presented in
[43]. Lai et al. presented a unified end-to-end security
scheme for machine-type communication in LTE networks
in [42]. However, none of these security solutions provide
a complete security framework to prevent IP-based attacks
on LTE backhaul network.
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:1198–1215 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1203
DOI: 10.1002/sec
Novel secure VPN architectures for LTE backhaul networks M. Liyanage et al.
4. INTERNET PROTOCOL SECURITY
TUNNEL MODE VIRTUAL PRIVATE
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
4.1. Description of the architecture
The first proposed architecture is an L3 IPsec tunnel mode
VPN. Figure 2 exhibits the protocol stack of the proposed
architecture.
Here, two VPNs are used in this exemplary scenario,
one VPN to deliver for the traffic towards the core network
and other one for the X2 interface traffic. However, it is
possible to define any number of backhaul VPNs according
to the requirements of operator.
The proposed architecture dynamically and securely
adds new nodes/devices to the backhaul network and estab-
lishes the secure VPN tunnels between them. The user and
control backhaul traffic will be transported via these secure
VPN tunnels. In this paper, we use the term “node” to rep-
resent a device in the LTE backhaul. Figure 3 illustrates
the nine steps node addition and VPN tunnel establishment
procedure of the proposed architecture.
In step 1, the network operator attaches the new node to
the backhaul network. In step 2, he or she adds the node
ID to the access control lists (ACLs). The proposed tunnel
mode architecture uses authorization server (AS) for the
access control. The mobile operator updates ACLs with the
list of legitimate nodes for each VPN. These ACLs are used
by AS to execute the access control decisions.
Thereafter, the new backhaul node is able to join the
network after following the three procedures, namely, node
authentication (steps 3–4), node authorization (steps 5–8),
and tunnel establishment (step 9) procedures. Therefore,
we propose a novel node addition procedure based on
Figure 2. The protocol stack of Internet protocol security (IPSec)/Internet key exchange version 2 virtual private network (VPN). MME,
mobility management entity; HSS, home subscriber server; PCRF, policy and charging rules function; DNS, domain name system;
MAC, media access control; eNBs, evolved NodeBs.
Figure 3. The flow of the dynamic node addition and tunnel establishment procedures. ACLs, access control lists; AS, authorization
server; IPsec, Internet protocol security.
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IKEv2 and novel tunnel establishment procedure based
on MOBIKE to carry out the rest of the steps of the
proposed procedure.
4.2. Node addition procedure
Node addition procedure is able to authenticate (steps 3–
4) and authorize (steps 5–8) the new nodes. Figure 4
illustrates the proposed message exchange mechanism for
node addition procedure. Here, the initiator is the poten-
tial node, and the responder is a member VPN node. A
member VPN node is a legitimate node who already has
access to the backhaul VPN. We use the same terminology,
which was used in [24], and the proposed modifications are
highlighted in Figure 4.
The procedure starts by sending INT1 message to a
responder by the initiator (step 3).
M1: This initial INT1 message contains header (HDR),
SA payloads, cryptographic key parameters, and a nonce.
HDR contains the security parameter indexes (SPIs) of
both nodes, the type of the next payload, version numbers,
the message identifier (ID), and various flags [24].
KEi contains the initiator’s parameters to generate a
Diffie–Hellman (D-H) key.
M2: Upon the arrival of INT1 message, the responder
sends RES1 message to the initiator without allocating any
resources. RES1 message contains HDR, a cryptographic
puzzle, a sequence number, and a cookie. The crypto-
graphic puzzle protects the responder from DoS attacks.
The task of the proposed puzzle is to find a solution J,
which produces K number of zeros when it passed through
SHA-1 hash function.
M3: Upon the arrival of RES1 message, the initia-
tor sends an INT2 message that contains an HDR, the
puzzle solution, SA payloads, cryptographic key param-
eters, a nonce, and the cookie. SA payload, HDR,
and cryptographic key parameter are the same as in
Figure 4. The Internet key exchange version 2 protocol-based
message exchange mechanism for node addition procedure.
ACL, access control list.
INT1, except that INT2 carries SPIs of both nodes in
HDR parameters.
M4: Upon the arrival of INT2 message, the respon-
der recalculates the cookie to verify the integrity of the
puzzle and then checks the solution of the puzzle. There-
after, the responder sends RES2 message that contains
HDR, SA payload, cryptographic key parameters, a nonce,
a sequence number, and a certificate request.
M5: The initiator sends INT3 message that contains
an HDR, IDs, certificates, the authentication payload, a
sequence number, and VPN ID. The initiator indicates the
potential VPN ID in VPN ID field. Because the D-H key
establishment is completed after the arrival of RES2 mes-
sage, all payload sections are encrypted in INT3 other
than HDR.
The identity of the initiator is verified after the arrival of
INT3 message (step 4). Thereafter, the responder relays the
initiator’s credentials to AS in order to complete the autho-
rization function. AS accepts only encapsulating security
payload (ESP) packets that are transported through IPsec
tunnels. Therefore, it is required to maintain an IPsec tun-
nel between each member VPN node and AS to support
this authorization function.
M6: The responder sends A1 message that is encrypted
and wrapped in ESP payload (step 5). A1 message contains
an HDR, the identity of the initiator (IDi), VPN ID, and an
echo request. The identity of the initiator and VPN ID are
required to check against ACLs to authorize the initiator
(step 6).
M7: After the validation of A1 message, AS sends an
A2 message to the responder, which is also encrypted and
wrapped in ESP payloads (step 7). A2 message contains
an HDR, an acknowledgment, the ID of the initiator, the
echo request, and a certificate. If the potential node is a
legitimate node for the VPN, AS sends an A2 packet with
a positive acknowledgment. A positive acknowledgment
grants the access to the VPN. If the potential node is not
a legitimate node, then a negative acknowledgment is sent,
and the responder discards the connection request from the
initiator. The certificate is signed by AS. This certificate is
used by the initiator to establish IPsec tunnels with peer
nodes in the same VPN.
M8: Upon the reception of a positive acknowledgment
from AS, the responder sends RES3 message to complete
the initial exchange procedure (step 8). RES3 message
contains an HDR, ID of the responder, the responder’s cer-
tificates, an authentication payload, a sequence number,
and AS’s certificate.
M9: Thereafter, the initiator sends INT4 message to
create a child SA for the IPsec tunnel. It contains an SA
payload, a nonce, a sequence number, and cryptographic
key parameters.
M10: Then, the responder sends RES4 message to
complete the creation of the child SA. RES4 has similar
obligatory fields as INT4.
The proposed BEX provides higher level of security
than IKEv2 because our procedure contains all security
mechanisms that are present in IKEv2 and few extra
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security features such as cryptographic puzzles, echo
requests, sequence counters, and certificates to avoid
replay and DoS attacks. In contrast to the original IKEv2
protocol, the proposed message exchange mechanism not
only authenticates the node but also authorizes the node
based on its node ID. Moreover, the novel message
exchange mechanism enhances the DoS attack resilience
of the system.
4.3. Tunnel establishment
Every member VPN node has two responsibilities related
to the VPN management, namely, support node autho-
rization function (i.e., steps 5 and 7) and data traffic
forwarding. These functions required to establish separate
IPsec tunnel instances.
First, the node authorization procedure needs an IPsec
tunnel between the member VPN node and AS (step 9).
Hence, first task of a newly joined node is to establish an
IPsec tunnel with AS. Second, we propose an encrypted
data communication mechanism for LTE backhaul. Hence,
an IPsec tunnel establishment is mandatory prior to any
kind of communication between other backhaul devices.
We propose a novel tunnel establishment procedure
based on MOBIKE protocol. Here, we propose to use
MOBIKE instead of IKEv2, because MOBIKE protocol
provides additional multihoming and mobility support for
end nodes. It is a requirement of some LTE backhaul nodes
such as vehicular and mobile femtocells [26].
Figure 5 illustrates the proposed message exchange
mechanism for IPsec tunnel establishment. We use the
same terminology that was used in [24,25], and the pro-
posed modifications are highlighted in Figure 5.
The format of INT1, RES1, INT2, RES2, INT4, and
RES4 message exchanges is similar to the correspond-
ing message exchanges in the previously described node
addition procedure (Figure 4). Here, the initiator sends an
authentication token (Auth-token) instead of VPN ID in
Figure 5. The Internet key exchange version 2 mobility and
multihoming protocol-based message exchange mechanism for
tunnel establishment.
INT3 in contrast to the previous INT3 message. In INT3
and RES3 messages, nodes exchange the Auth-tokens and
the format of an Auth-Token as follows:
Auth – Token = Hash(Certificate – AS | IDi | IDr) (1)
IDi and IDr are the identities of the initiator and the
responder. Certificate – AS is the certificate that is received
during the node addition phase. An intruder cannot estab-
lish an IPsec tunnel with a legitimate member VPN node
without a valid Auth-token.
Furthermore, both INT3 and RES3 messages con-
tain N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED) payload to notify that
both peers are supporting MOBIKE specification. Finally,
N(ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES) payload contains the
set of addresses available for each peer that can change
during the lifetime of SA without terminating the
IPsec tunnel.
The proposed message exchange provides a higher level
of security than MOBIKE protocol. Our procedure con-
tains all the security mechanisms that are available in
MOBIKE and contains extra security features such as cryp-
tographic puzzles, echo requests, sequence counters, and
certificates to avoid replay and DoS attacks.
Tunnel establish procedures for both node authoriza-
tion function and data traffic forwarding are almost similar.
However, we propose to use ingress filter before AS for
extra protection. The ingress filter drops all the connec-
tion requests from unauthenticated nodes. Once a node is
authenticated, AS updates the filter list. This will prevent
the unauthorized connection requests and potential DoS
attacks (resource consuming) on AS.
5. INTERNET PROTOCOL SECURITY
BOUND END-TO-END TUNNEL
MODE VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK
ARCHITECTURE
5.1. Description of the architecture
The second proposed architecture is an L3 VPN architec-
ture based on HIP. It proposes to create IPsec BEET mode
tunnels on top of the backhaul network.
The underline protocol stack of IPsec BEET mode VPN
architecture is illustrated in Figure 6. We interchangeably
called IPsec BEET mode VPN architecture as HIP VPN
architecture in the rest of the paper.
Internet protocol security BEET mode VPN architec-
ture also allows to dynamically add new nodes to the
backhaul network. It also follows the nine steps, the
node addition, and tunnel establishment procedures that is
shown in Figure 3.
In step 1, the network operator attaches the new node
to the backhaul network, and he or she updates the node
ID to ACLs in step 2. Thereafter, the new backhaul
node is able to join the network after following the three
procedures, namely, node authentication (steps 3–4), node
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Figure 6. The protocol stack of Internet protocol security (IPsec) bound end-to-end tunnel (BEET) mode virtual private network (VPN)
architecture. MME, mobility management entity; HSS, home subscriber server; PCRF, policy and charging rules function; DNS, domain
name system; eNBs, evolved NodeBs; HIP, host identity protocol; MAC, media access control.
authorization (steps 5–8), and tunnel establishment (step
9). Therefore, we propose a novel node addition procedure
and novel tunnel establishment procedure based on HIP to
carry out the rest of the steps of the proposed procedure.
5.2. Node addition procedure
Node addition procedure is able to authenticate (steps 3–
4) and authorize (steps 5–8) the new nodes. Figure 7
illustrates the proposed BEX procedure for node addition
procedure. Here, the initiator is the potential node, and
the responder is a member VPN node. We use the same
terminology that was used for HIP BEX in [27], and the
proposed modifications are highlighted in Figure 7.
M1: The first message (I1) contains only HITs of the
initiator and responder. It triggers the BEX procedure
(step 3).
M2: Upon the arrival of I1 message, the responder
sends R1 message to the initiator. R1 message contains a
Figure 7. The base exchange procedure for node addition pro-
cedure. ACL, access control list.
cryptographic puzzle, D-H key parameters, the public key
of the responder, ESP transforms, HIP transforms, an echo
request, a sequence number, and a signature. The crypto-
graphic puzzle avoids DoS attacks. The responder does not
allocate any resource for the initiator until the arrival of
the correct solution for the puzzle in I2 packet. D-H key
parameters are used to generate a symmetric key for ESP
payload encryption.
M3: After the arrival of R1 message, the initiator sends
I2 message that contains hash message authentication code
(HMAC), the solution to the puzzle, encrypted D-H key
parameters, the public key of the initiator, ESP transforms,
HIP transforms, SPIs, the echo reply, VPN ID, and a signa-
ture. I2 has similar obligatory fields as R1, except that the
puzzle parameter contains the solution.
The identity of the initiator is verified after the arrival
of the I2 message (step 4). Then, it is a duty of the respon-
der to relay the initiator’s credentials to AS in order to
complete the authentication function. AS only accepts ESP
packets that are transported through HIP tunnels. There-
fore, it is required to maintain an HIP tunnel between each
member VPN node and AS to support such an authentica-
tion function.
M4: The responder sends A1 message that is wrapped
within the ESP payload (step 5). A1 message has same for-
mat as I1, R1, and I2, except it is encrypted and wrapped
in ESP payload. It contains HMAC, HIT of the initiator, an
echo request, VPN ID, and a signature. HIT of the initia-
tor and VPN ID are checked with ACLs to authorize the
initiator (step 6).
M5: After the validation of A1 message, AS sends an
A2 message to the responder, which is also encrypted and
wrapped in ESP payload (step 7). A2 message contains
HMAC, an acknowledgment, HIT of the initiator, the echo
reply, a certificate, and a signature.
M6: Upon the reception of a positive acknowledgment,
the responder sends R2 message to complete the BEX pro-
cedure (step 8). R2 message contains HMAC, SPIs, the
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encrypted certificate, a sequence number, and a signature.
The responder completes SPI agreement by sending its SPI
in R2. Also, it relays the certificate that is issued by AS.
It is encrypted by using the public key of the initiator. The
sequence number contains the monotonically increasing
“R2 generation counter” value that is used to protect the
initiator from R2 messages-based replay attacks.
Similar to the original HIP BEX, the proposed BEX
procedure is capable to mutually authenticate nodes based
on public key infrastructures, establish SAs for IPsec com-
munication, negotiate keys for encryption, prevent DoS,
and replay attacks. Thus, the proposed BEX provides the
similar level of security as the original HIP BEX because
our procedure contains all the security mechanisms, which
are available in HIP BEX. In addition to the features of
the original HIP protocol, the proposed message exchange
mechanism is able to authorize the node based on its
node HI. The proposed exchange mechanism is somewhat
longer than original HIP BEX and adds extra overhead
because of new A1 and A2 message exchanges. However,
it will not effect significantly to the overall performance
because the authorization phase will be called only once
for each node.
5.3. Tunnel establishment
Every member VPN node has two responsibilities related
to the VPN management, namely, support node autho-
rization function (i.e., steps 5 and 7) and data traffic
forwarding. These functions required two separate IPsec
tunnel instances.
First, the node authorization procedure needs an IPsec
tunnel between the member VPN node and AS (step 9).
Hence, the first task of a newly joined node is to establish
an IPsec tunnel with AS. Second, we propose an encrypted
data communication mechanism for LTE backhaul. Hence,
an IPsec tunnel establishment is mandatory prior to any
kind of communication between two nodes.
We propose a novel exchange procedure for these HIP
tunnel establishment instances. Similar to the previous
authentication phase, this procedure is also based on HIP
BEX [27]. Figure 8 illustrates the proposed BEX procedure
for HIP tunnel establishment.
The format of the message exchanges is similar to
the corresponding messages in the BEX procedure of
the node addition phase. However, the initiator sends an
Figure 8. The base exchange procedure for host identity proto-
col tunnel establishment.
Auth-token instead of VPN ID in I2 in contrast to the
previous I2 message. In I2 and R2 messages, nodes
exchange the Auth-tokens and the format of an Auth-Token
as follows:
Auth – Token = Hash(Certificate – AS | HI – I | HI – R) (2)
HI –I and HI –R are the identities of the initiator and the
responder. Certificate – AS is the certificate that is received
during the node addition phase. An intruder cannot estab-
lish an IPsec tunnel with a legitimate member VPN node
without a valid Auth-token.
Tunnel establish procedures for both node authoriza-
tion function and data traffic forwarding are almost similar.
However, we propose to use ingress filter before AS for
extra protection. The ingress filter drops all the connec-
tion requests from unauthenticated nodes. Once a node is
authenticated, AS updates the filter list. This will prevent
the unauthorized connection requests and potential DoS
attacks (resource consuming) on AS.
6. PROTECTION FROM INTERNET
PROTOCOL-BASED ATTACK
The proposed VPN architectures are simulated on
OMNET++ and conducted several extended simulations to
study the performance under DoS, DDoS, TCP reset, and
IP spoofing attacks. 3GPP specifications [1–3] have spec-
ified the requirements of IPsec in order to protect some
of the backhaul interfaces. However, present mobile ser-
vices achieve the end-to-end security at the application
level [7,8]. Thus, we use a TLS/SSL VPN as our refer-
ence model here. TLS/SSL VPN is a layer 4 secured VPN
that provides end-to-end security at the application layer.
Similar to the existing LTE backhaul traffic architectures,
it does not provide any L3 protection.
6.1. Impact of denial of service/distributed
denial of service attack
Transmission control protocol synchronization (SYN)
packet flooding attack is used to model DoS attack. Our
system model contains a single VPN that has 60 nodes and
a server. Nodes are randomly connected with other nodes
with maximum of four neighbors. All nodes upload data
traffic to the server, and this server is under attack. We use
an application server here. This application server will rep-
resent any of the backhaul core network element such as
MME, P/GW, or AS. The attacker (TCP packet generator)
sends forged TCP SYN packets to the server by changing
the port number and the source IP address (one change per
packet). The server allocates one server port for every suc-
cessfully arrived SYN packet. As the TCP timeout value is
270 s [31], such an attacked port will not be released until
the TCP timeout expires. Likewise, the attacker occupies
all ports (64,000 per IP address) [31].
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Figure 9. Impact of transmission control protocol synchroniza-
tion denial of service attack. TLS, transport layer security; SSL,
secure sockets layer; BEET, bound end-to-end tunnel.
The LTE backhaul bandwidth is set to 500 Mbps, and
attackers have 100 Mbps connection. The simulation runs
for 500 s, and the attack is placed from 25 to 125 s.
In the first experiment, we use only one attacker.
According to Figure 9, we observe that proposed VPN
architecture has no significant throughput drop during the
attack period. It achieves the maximum throughput similar
to the non-attacking period. However, TLS/SSL VPN has
almost 0 throughput during the DoS attack. TLS/SSL VPN
takes at least the duration of a TCP timeout in addition to
the attack duration to fully recover from the attack.
6.2. Impact of transmission control
protocol reset attack
The TCP reset attack is an IP-based attack where an
attacker sends fake TCP packets to end points by setting the
reset bit to 1. However, the attacker must include correct IP
addresses, port numbers, and a valid sequence number in
the packet header. Once these fake TCP packets match all
these parameters, end-point nodes reset the ongoing TCP
connection [32].
If the attacker eavesdrops the ongoing TCP session traf-
fic, he or she can learn about IP addresses and TCP port.
Now, the attacker needs to know only the sequence num-
ber. In such a case, the attacker sends fake TCP packets
(with no payload) by increasing the sequence number until
it resets the attacked TCP connection. For each packet,
the sequence number is increased by a window size that
is 16,384 (typical value for Cisco routers) [32]. Other-
wise, the attacker has to randomly guess all the parameters.
Thus, we use TCP reset attack to illustrate the impact of
eavesdropping attacks. In our experiment, the attacker has
the same bandwidth (500 Mbps) as other nodes.
The probability of successful attack (Figure 10) is cal-
culated against the file size. By considering the file sizes
Figure 10. Impact of transmission control protocol reset attack.
TLS, transport layer security; SSL, secure sockets layer; BEET,
bound end-to-end tunnel.
in the Internet, it is found that the minimum file size is
4.5 KB, and the maximum size is 20 MB [44].
Because the attacker cannot eavesdrop the IP addresses
and port numbers from the ESP payload, proposed VPN
architecture has minimum/no effect from TCP reset attack.
Thus, the proposed architecture has zero probability to be
attacked. However, the probability of a successful attack
for the TLS/SSL VPN increases with the file size. A
TLS/SSL VPN is lacking of encryption at L3. Hence,
the attacker learns all the parameters by eavesdropping
the VPN session. He or she needs to find only the
correct sequence number, and larger file sizes provide
more time (higher transmission time) for the attacker to
guess the correct sequence number parameters to reset the
connection falsely.
6.3. Impact of Internet protocol
spoofing attack
During an IP spoofing attack, the attacker generates IP
packets with forged IP address to impersonate as a legit-
imate node [33]. There are three common types of IP
spoofing attacks, namely, random spoofing, subnet spoof-
ing, and fixed spoofing [45]. In random spoofing attacks,
the attacker generates IP packets with randomly gener-
ated 32-bit numbers as IP addresses. In subnet spoofing
attacks, the attacker uses IP addresses that are taken from
the address space corresponding to the network subnet.
In fixed spoofing attacks, the attacker selects IP addresses
from a given list. It is a subset of subnet spoofing attacks.
In this experiment, we simulate random spoofing and
subnet spoofing attacks. Here, we use the same simu-
lation model for previous experiments. In this experi-
ment, the attacker has the same bandwidth (500 Mbps) as
other nodes.
The simulation results (Figure 11) verify that TLS/SSL
VPN architecture is vulnerable to both subnet and random
spoofing attacks. By utilizing an ingress filter, the server
drops the connection request outside the subnet address
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Figure 11. Impact of Internet protocol spoofing attack. TLS,
transport layer security; SSL, secure sockets layer; BEET, bound
end-to-end tunnel.
space. It significantly reduces the impact of random spoof-
ing attacks. However, TLS/SSL VPN is still vulnerable to
subnet spoofing attacks even with ingress filters.
On the other hand, proposed architecture has no effect
from both IP spoofing attacks. As we have similar results
for all the tests, we present results-related subnet spoofing
attacks with the ingress filter scenario only.
7. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze security features of proposed
VPN architectures.
7.1. Protection against denial of service
and distributed denial of service attacks
Denial of service attacks are the most common IP-
based attack scenarios in IP-based networks. In most DoS
attacks, attackers send an extensive amount of connections
requests (e.g., TCP SYN requests). However, they will
not continue the rest of the steps or message exchanges.
In LTE backhaul, a compromise eNB can try to overload
an MME or PGW by sending lots of connection estab-
lishment requests [5]. However, our architectures propose
to establish an IPsec tunnel before the communication.
These tunnel establishments are protected from DoS and
DDoS attacks.
If attackers send a series of INT1 packets in tunnel
mode architecture, the responder replies with RES1 packet
for each INT1 without allocation of any resources such as
memory space and port. Each RES1 contains a precom-
puted puzzle, and it increases the commitment requirement
of the attacker. Furthermore, the responder does not spend
any extra processing power other than the processing of a
general packet. Even a simple switch can handle thousands
of connection requests (e.g., 1 Gbps switch can process
1,488,095 packets per second). Thus, the impact of the first
INT1 is negligible although the responder sends an RES1
message for every INT1 request.
If attackers send a series of I1 packets in BEET mode
architecture, the responder replies with R1 packet for
each I1 without allocation of any resources such as mem-
ory space and port. Each R1 contains a precomputed
puzzle, and it increases the commitment requirement of
the attacker.
However, our architecture does not prevent volume-
based DoS attacks such as user datagram protocol
floods, Internet control message protocol floods, and other
spoofed-packet floods. In volume-based DoS attacks, the
attackers dump excessive amount of junk traffic to overload
the network links. Such attacks can be easily prevented
by implementing firewalls, ingress filtering, and enforcing
rate bounds [46,47]. These security solutions are indepen-
dent of our architecture, and we recommend to implement
them in the backhaul network. Moreover, filtering mech-
anisms are commonly used in almost all the network
because volume-based DoS attacks are very common in
present networks.
7.2. Protection against replay attacks
Replay attacks are possible at three stages such as data
communication, node addition, and tunnel establishment
phases.
Both architectures use IPsec ESP mode for the data
communication. IPsec ESP mode utilizes sequence num-
bers to protect the messages against the replay attacks. A
sequence number is assigned for each IPSec packet, and
it is monotonically increasing. Any IPsec packet without a
proper sequence number will be dropped by nodes. If an
intruder tries to replay an IPSec-encrypted packet, then the
sequence number will not fit because the counter values
have already increased by the original packets.
During the node addition and tunnel establishment
phases, tunnel mode architecture uses the following mech-
anisms against replay attacks. Virtue of the stateless
response to INT1 messages with pre-calculated RES1
messages is used to protect responders against attacker’s
replays of INT1 messages. A monotonically increasing
“RES1 generation counter”, which is included in RES1, is
used to protect the initiator from RES1 replays. RES1 gen-
eration counter is a 64-bit counter, and it can be initialized
to any value randomly. Again, responders are protected
against attacker’s replays of INT2 messages by using the
puzzle mechanism and cookies. Both puzzle and cook-
ies use time stamps to avoid replay attacks. Similar to
the “RES1 generation counter”, the rest of the messages,
namely, RES2, INT3, RES3, INT4, and RES4, use similar
counter mechanism to avoid the replay attacks.
Bound end-to-end tunnel mode architecture uses the
following mechanisms to prevent replay attacks during
the node addition and tunnel establishment phases. Virtue
of the stateless response to I1s with pre-calculated R1
messages is used to protect responders against attacker’s
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replays of INT1 messages. A monotonically increasing
“R1 generation counter”, which is included in R1, is used
to protect the initiator from R1 replays. Again, responders
are protected against attacker’s replays of I2 messages by
using the puzzle mechanism and optional use of opaque
data. Finally, a monotonically increasing “R2 generation
counter”, which is included in R2, is used to protect the ini-
tiator from R2 replays. Moreover, the use of less expensive
HMAC verification preceding HIP signature verification
also provides the additional replay attack protection for I2,
R2, A1, and A2 messages.
Both architectures use IPsec ESP mode messages to
deliver A1 and A2 messages. These messages are protected
from the sequence number-based replay-attack prevention
mechanism of IPsec ESP mode tunnels.
7.3. Protection against Internet protocol
spoofing attacks
One method of preventing IP spoofing attacks is to verify
the node identity behind the IP address. Both architec-
tures use strong node authentication mechanisms based
on public key authentication. Proposed mutual authenti-
cation mechanisms use node IDs (trusted certificate or
cryptographic key) to prove the identity of the node than
the IP address. Thus, mutual authentication mechanisms
are capable to verify identity of the entity behind the
IP address.
In addition, both architecture uses signature to sign
messages with the private key of the node. This signature
also reveals spoofed identifiers.
7.4. Protection against eavesdropping
attacks
Active attackers eavesdrop the ongoing communication
channels and use the gathered information to perform var-
ious attacks such as IP spoofing, TCP reset, and replay
attacks. Among them, TCP reset attack is the most com-
mon IP-based attack on TCP sessions. Here, we use the
TCP reset attack scenario as a reference to illustrate the
impact of eavesdropping attacks. On the other hand, we
already discuss the protection against IP spoofing and
replay attacks.
The first step in a TCP reset attack is to eavesdrop the
ongoing TCP session and extract the TCP header informa-
tion to perform the reset attack. An attacker needs to find
five header fields to perform the reset attack. Those param-
eters are the source IP address (32 bits), the destination IP
address (32 bits), the source port (16 bits), the destination
port (16 bits), and a matching sequence number (32 bits)
[32]. If the attacker is able to successfully eavesdrop an
ongoing TCP session, he or she can collect four parame-
ters, that is, IP addresses and ports. Then, he or she has to
guess only a sequence number (32 bits).
In [32], authors mathematically analyze the TCP reset
attack scenarios. In this case, the average time that is









By using the typical values (window size = 65,535, data
rate = 500 Mbps, and packet size = 320 bits) [32], the aver-
age time that is required to reset a TCP connection is below
50 ms.
However, both architectures use IPsec ESP mode mes-
sages, and all TCP header information is encrypted.
Therefore, the attacker cannot eavesdrop the TCP header
information, and the attacker has to guess not only a
sequence number but also other four parameters. In this
case, the average time that is required to reset a TCP con-
nection is over 2 months. Thus, the data communication is
protected from TCP reset attacks.
Moreover, simulation results (Section 6) verify that pro-
posed architectures are protected from TCP reset attacks.
7.5. The protection of the authorization
server
A new node cannot initiate a direct communication session
with AS. Every new node including a potential attacker
has to pass two authentication steps to communicate with
AS. First, an outsider has to connect an existing member
VPN node to gain the access to a VPN. Then only, he or
she can establish an IPsec tunnel with AS. However, these
two steps are secured by strong public key infrastructure
authentication and authorization procedures. Hence, AS is
double protected compared with any other backhaul node.
However, if the attacker is anyhow able to compromise
an authenticated node (a member VPN node), then the
attacker can send an excessive amount of requests. To pre-
vent such situations, we propose to utilize an ingress filter
with rate bound limits. AS sets a rate bound for each mem-
ber node. Once the node’s traffic flow has reached to this
rate bound limit, AS resets the connection with the node. In
that way, AS can easily terminate the communication with
jeopardized nodes.
Because this paper only addresses the security issues
in LTE backhaul network, the proposed security mecha-
nisms are sufficient enough to secure AS from the IP-based
attacks that are originated within the backhaul network.
Furthermore, we propose to use a logically centralized
distributed AS system to avoid the single point of failure.
8. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
8.1. The impact on file transmission delay
We investigate the performance penalty on the file trans-
mission delay of the proposed architectures. Three nodes
are used for the simulation as the initiator, the responder,
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and the AS. We compare the performance under three
scenarios, namely, (1) the tunnel is already established
between the initiator and responder; (2) the initiator is
authenticated and authorized, but no tunnel is established;
and (3) the initiator is not even authenticated.
We change the file sizes from 5 KB to 20 MB by con-
sidering the file sizes in the Internet [44]. The bandwidth
of the connections between the nodes is set to 100 Kbps.
Figure 12 illustrates the transmission delay of the BEET
architecture as a percentage of the transmission delay of






According to simulation results in Figure 12, BEET
mode VPN has similar performance as the original HIP
with the presence of already established tunnels. Hence, we
can conclude that the proposed changes do not affect the
performance of HIP at the steady state operation of VPN.
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BEET Mode with Authentication
Figure 12. The impact on file transmission delay on bound end-
to-end tunnel (BEET) mode tunnel virtual private network. HIP,
host identity protocol.




















MOBIKE without Tunnel Establishment
Tunnel Mode without Tunnel Establishment
MOBIKE with Tunnel Establishment
Tunnel Mode with Tunnel Establishment
Tunnel Mode with Authentication
Figure 13. The impact on file transmission delay on tunnel
mode tunnel virtual private network. MOBIKE, Internet key
exchange version 2 mobility and multihoming protocol.
Furthermore, the tunnels establishment and node addition
(node authentication and authorization) phase have defi-
cient performance than the original HIP. However, the
difference between HIP and the BEET mode VPN tun-
nels is gradually decreasing with the increment of file
size. Hence, we can conclude that the performance penalty
due to tunnels establishment and node addition phases can
be compensated by keeping the established tunnels for a
longer period.
According to the simulation results in Figure 13, the
tunnel mode VPN has similar performance as the original
MOBIKE with the presence of already established tunnels.
Hence, we can conclude that the proposed modifications
do not affect the performance of the MOBIKE protocol
at the steady state operation of VPN. Furthermore, the
tunnels establishment and node addition phases have inef-
ficient performance than the original MOBIKE protocol.
However, the difference between MOBIKE protocol and
the tunnel mode VPN tunnels is gradually decreasing with
the increment of file size. Hence, this performance penalty
can be compensated by keeping the established tunnels for
a longer period.
8.2. The impact on file transmission
overhead
We investigate the performance penalty on the through-
put of proposed architecture by measuring the impact on
file transmission overhead. Three nodes are used for the
simulation as the initiator, the responder, and the AS. We
compare the performance under the same three scenarios
as the previous experiment.
Figure 14 illustrate the total overhead for the BEET



























HIP without Tunnel Establishment
BEET Mode without Tunnel Establishment
HIP with Tunnel Establishment
BEET Mode with Tunnel Establishment
BEET Mode with Authentication
Figure 14. The performance penalty of security on throughput
of bound end-to-end tunnel (BEET) mode architecture. HIP, host
identity protocol.
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Figure 15. The performance penalty of security on throughput
of tunnel mode architecture.
According to the simulation results in Figure 14, the
BEET mode VPN has similar performance as the origi-
nal HIP with the presence of already established tunnels.
Hence, we can conclude that the proposed modifications do
not affect the performance of HIP at the steady state opera-
tion of the VPN. Furthermore, both HIP tunnels and BEET
mode VPN tunnels increase the overhead only by 3.8% at
steady state operation. Thus, the overhead penalty at steady
state operation is less significant for the BEET mode VPN
architecture compared with the non-secure scenario.
However, the tunnel establishment and node addition
phases add extra overhead to the BEET mode VPN tun-
nels. This extra overhead between HIP and the BEET
mode VPN tunnels is gradually decreasing with the incre-
ment of file sizes. Hence, this performance penalty can
be compensated by keeping the established tunnels for a
long period.
According to the simulation results in Figure 15, the
tunnel mode VPN has similar performance as the original
MOBIKE with the presence of already established tunnels.
Hence, we can conclude that the proposed modifications
do not affect the performance of MOBIKE at the steady
state operation of the VPN. Furthermore, both MOBIKE
and tunnel mode VPN tunnels increase the overhead only
by 4.4% than non-secure scenario. Thus, the overhead
penalty at steady state operation is very low in tunnel
mode architecture.
However, the tunnel establishment and node addition
phases add extra overhead for the tunnel mode VPN tun-
nels. This extra overhead between MOBIKE and the tunnel
mode VPN tunnels is gradually decreasing with the incre-
ment of file size. Hence, this performance penalty can
be compensated by keeping the established tunnels for a
longer period.
9. DISCUSSION
9.1. Comparison of Internet protocol
security tunnel mode and Internet protocol
security bound end-to-end tunnel mode
virtual private networks
Internet protocol security BEET mode VPN architec-
ture anticipates several benefits than IPsec tunnel mode
architecture. First, a single HI can represent several phys-
ical/logical interfaces with different IP addresses. Hence,
multihomed nodes can obtain advantages such as high
throughput and extra security for packet sniffing attacks
by using proper load-balancing mechanisms. Second, HIP
supports the “rendezvous” mechanism. It helps to pro-
vide automatic redundancy support in the event of two
simultaneous network outages that can occur at both ends
of the tunnels. Third, the BEET mode VPN architec-
ture has better performance in the tunnel establishment
phase and the node addition phase than IPsec tunnel
mode VPN architecture. Fourth, a HIP-enabled back-
haul architecture can be used to provide new services
for mobile networks, for example, L2-secured automatic
virtual private local area network service for mobile
nodes [48].
Although BEET mode VPN architecture provides many
advantages compared with the IPsec tunnel mode VPN,
it has a very high initial capital cost. BEET mode VPN
architecture requires new HIP-enabled backhaul network
elements such as switches, routers, eNBs, MMEs, ASs,
servers, and S-GWs. Hence, network appliance providers
have to develop new HIP-enabled equipments, and an oper-
ator has to implement these new network appliances in
their network. This is a protracted and expensive process.
However, most of the existing network element supports
IPsec tunnel mode VPN architecture. Hence, operators can
deploy it with a minimum initial cost by using existing
network appliances.
10. CONCLUSION
We presented two secure VPN-based traffic architectures
for the LTE backhaul network. The proposed architec-
tures are L3 IPsec VPNs based on MOBIKE and HIP.
We proposed novel BEX procedures to authenticate and
authorize new nodes and novel tunnel establishment pro-
cedures to establish secure VPN tunnels between LTE
backhaul devices. The proposed architectures secure the
backhaul traffic by satisfying the LTE backhaul security
requirements, namely, node authentication, node autho-
rization, payload encryption, privacy protection, and IP-
based attacks prevention.
The security analysis and simulation results verified that
proposed architectures provide a secured backhaul traf-
fic transportation during TCP SYN DoS, TCP reset, and
IP spoofing attacks. Furthermore, proposed VPN archi-
tectures have similar performance penalty of security as
original protocols, that is, MOBIKE and HIP in the steady
state of operation and the availability of long-lasting
tunnel establishments.
This research forms the base for several future research
topics, namely, develop a secure distributed authentica-
tion server architecture for the LTE backhaul, study the
impact of mobile backhaul nodes such as mobile fem-
tocells to the VPN architecture, and study an optimum
load-balancing mechanisms for multihomed nodes. More-
over, we are focusing to extended these architectures
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to provide additional load balancing, automatic redun-
dancy, and best path-routing features in future mesh back-
haul networks.
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